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Recent Developments 
Wallace v. Jaffree: MOMENT OF 
SILENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The appellee, Ishmael J affree, filed a 
complaint in the Federal District Court 
for the Southern District of Alabama on 
behalf of three of his children seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief. See Jaf-
free v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Ala. 
1982). The complaint alleged that the 
local school board, through its teachers, 
was engaged in the "maintenance of regu-
lar religious prayer services ... in viola-
tion of the First Amendment as made 
applicable to states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution." See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 
2479, 2482-83 (1985) (citation omitted). 
The original complaint was subsequently 
amended to join the Governor of the State 
of Alabama and various state officials as 
party defendants in the action, obtain class 
certification, and to challenge the consti-
tutionality of three Alabama statutes. 
The district court initially determined 
that two of the three statutes were uncon-
stitutional because their sole purpose was 
to "encourage a religious activity." Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985) (ci-
tation omitted). Accordingly, the court 
entered a preliminary injunction. Later, 
however, the court conducted a trial on 
the merits and determined that the statutes 
did not violate the first amendment to the 
constitution because "the first amendment 
... does not prohibit the state from estab-
lishing a religion." Id. at 2484. The court 
purported to base its conclusion on what 
it viewed as "newly discovered historical 
evidence" that the framers of the constitu-
tion did not intend to proscribe state es-
tablishment of religion, only national es-
tablishment of a dominant religion. The 
Supreme Court per Stevens, J. found that 
this "remarkable conclusion" was without 
merit and affirmed the court of appeals 
reversal of the district court. Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985). The sole 
issue on appeal was whether the statute 
which authorized a moment of silence "or 
voluntary prayer" was constitutional un-
der the establishment clause of the first 
amendment. 
The Supreme Court found it unneces-
sary to go beyond the "secular purpose" 
prong of the Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Writing for 
the majority, Justice Stevens declared that 
"the record ... reveals that the enactment 
of ... [the statute] was not motivated by 
any clearly secular purpose - indeed, the 
statute had no secular purpose." Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. at 2490 (emphasis orig-
inal). The Court referred to the trial record 
and recalled the testimony of one of the 
sponsors of the legislation. This individual 
had testified that, apart from a desire to re-
turn prayer to the public schools, he "did 
not have no other purpose in mind" [sic] 
when he pressed for enactment of the pro-
posed statute in the state legislature. Id. 
at 2490. 
The Court observed that since an earlier 
statute already afforded school children 
the opportunity to engage in voluntary 
silent prayer, the legislative intent to re-
turn vocal prayer to the public schools 
was evident. Indeed, the Court noted that 
the state itself had not expressed any secu-
lar motivation for the statute in its brief to 
the Court. Id. at 2491. Thus, the Court 
found that the addition of the words "or 
voluntary prayer" to the previous statute 
indicated "that the State intended to char-
acterize prayer as the favored practice." 
Id. at 2492. The Court concluded: 
The importance of [the principle of 
complete neutrality toward religion] 
does not permit us to treat this as an 
inconsequential case involving noth-
ing more than a few words of sym-
bolic speech on behalf of the political 
majority .... Keeping in mind ... 
'both the fundamental place held by 
the Establishment Clause in our con-
stitutional scheme and the myriad, 
subtle ways in which Establishment 
Clause values can be erroded,' we 
conclude that ... [the statute] violates 
the First Amendment. 
Id. at 2492-93 (citations omitted). 
There were two concurring opinions in 
Jaffree. Justice Powell expressed concern 
that continued criticism of the Lemon test 
would tend to "encourage other courts to 
feel free to decide Establishment Clause 
cases on an ad hoc basis." Id. at 2494. He 
pointed out that the Lemon inquiry pro-
vided the courts with "identifie[ d] stan-
dards that have proven useful in analyzing 
case after case .... " Id. at 2493-94. Fi-
nally, Justice Powell expressly indicated 
that he would have little difficulty up-
holding any statute which authorized "a 
straightforward moment-of-silence." Id. 
at 2495. 
In her opinion concurring in the judg-
ment, Justice O'Connor also expressly en-
dorsed the "moment-of-silence" concept 
and affirmed her basic confidence in the 
Lemon standards. However, on this latter 
point she urged changes in the manner in 
which the Court applies the Lemon test. 
Justice O'Connor indicated that the ob-
vious problem in examining statutes un-
der the establishment and free exercise 
clauses is the conflict which is created 
when the two clauses are "expanded to a 
logical extreme." Id. at 2504. (citation 
omitted). That is to say, that when gov-
ernment acts in a manner which is of ben-
efit to religion (as in providing free bus 
transportation to and from school for all 
pupils in a county, whether they attend 
public or sectarian schools), it is arguable 
that government is thereby "promoting" 
or "establishing" religion. If, on the other 
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hand, government acts in a manner which 
has an adverse effect on sectarian interests 
(such as withholding free bus transporta-
tion from pupils at sectarian schools) it is 
equally arguable that government is acting 
to "inhibit" the free exercise of religion. 
Justice O'Connor expressed the view 
that the Court has, in the past, "exacer-
bated the conflict by calling for govern-
ment 'neutrality' toward religion." She 
declared: "The solution to the conflict be-
tween the religion clauses lies not in 'neu-
trality,' but rather in identifying workable 
limits to the Government's license to pro-
mote the free exercise of religion." Id. 
at 2496. To this end, Justice O'Connor 
would add an "endorsement test" by 
which the "effect" and "purpose" prongs 
of the Lemon test would be judged. This 
proposal was originally advocated by Jus-
tice O'Connor in her concurrence in 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984) 
(holding that expenditures by the state for 
the purpose of erecting a nativity creche 
did not violate the establishment clause). 
The "endorsement test" advocated by Jus-
tice O'Connor would ostensibly enhance 
the Lemon purpose and effect tests by fo-
cussing on "whether [the] government's 
purpose is to endorse religion and whether 
the statute actually conveys a message of 
endorsement." Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. at 2497. 
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While the "endorsement" concept artic-
ulated by Justice O'Connor may appear 
intriguing, it is hardly a novel concept; it 
is merely a restatement of the Lemon "ef-
fect" test which calls for a determination 
of whether a statute "advances" religion. 
Indeed, it seemingly would substitute 
"endorsement" for "advancement" and 
thereby weaken the Lemon inquiry. Jus-
tice O'Connor went on to illustrate the 
application of the "endorsement" test in 
circumstances analogous to those before 
the Court in the instant case. 
Presumably, Justice O'Connor's en-
dorsement test would allow states to enact 
"moment of silence" statutes which ex-
pressly informed the student that he or 
she is free to use that moment to silently 
pray. However, as was clearly expressed 
by the majority opinion, the addition of 
the words "or to pray" permit the student 
nothing beyond that which he or she al-
ready had, and can be interpreted in no 
other way but as an "endorsement" of re-
ligion. Conversely, failure to include such 
words in a statute do nothing to inhibit a 
student's freedom of silent expression or 
exercise of religion. Accordingly, the con-
flicting values inherent in the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses of the first 
amendment, "if expanded to their logical 
extremes", need never "clash". While Jus-
tice O'Connor correctly pointed out that 
"the courts are capable of distinguishing a 
sham secular purpose from a sincere one", 
Id. at 2500, implementation of a so-called 
"endorsement" test would do little to clarify 
the inquiry. 
Maryland's "moment-of-silence" statute, 
Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 7-104 (1985), 
would seem to run afoul of the constitu-
tional standards set out in Lemon and its 
progeny. The statute provides: 
(a) Silent meditation. Principal and 
teachers in each public elementary 
and secondary school in this State 
may require all students to be 
present and participate in opening 
exercises on each morning of a 
school day and to meditate silently 
for approximately 1 minute. 
(b) Praying or reading holy scripture 
permitted. During this period, a 
student or teacher may read the 
holy scripture or pray. 
The provision which appears to vest in 
each individual principal and teacher dis-
cretionary power to compel attendance at 
moment of silence exercises in the public 
schools appears to go well beyond even 
the statute struck down in Jaffree. By its 
very terms, the statute is neither volun-
tary nor does it enhance privacy of thought 
or deed. Further, the provisions which 
allow such compelled attendance at an ex-
ercise in which the participants (including 
teachers) are encouraged to produce "holy 
scripture(s)" are clearly violative of the 
Lemon test. Finally, the statute contains 
the "or [to] pray" language held offensive 
in Jaffree. 
It seems clear that the Maryland statute 
would not withstand judicial scrutiny. 
Accordingly, the statute should be re-
drafted to reflect the "moment-of-silence" 
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in 
Jaffree. 
- Christopher N. Luhn 
